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My personal interest in identity negotiation and formation inspired my intellectual curiosity, 
which blossomed into the backbone of my theoretical Honors thesis, or what I refer to as the 
study of the ‘self’. This thesis is based on examining how we, as individuals, understand the 
conception of our ‘selves’ in the context of powerful groups. I was initially fascinated with the 
possibility that an individual could identify so strongly with a group that they forget about their 
morality, individuality, and sense of humanity—or redefines these values in order to fit into a 
group. Thinking first about hazing in fraternities and sororities, I sought to understand an aspect 
of the Bystander Effect, curious about the formation of identity through symbolic boundary: 
Where does one ‘draw the line’? How does the individual see him or herself within the hierarchy 
of such a potentially punitive group? If they do, how does the individual separate him or herself 
from the group? Because hazing is difficult to study, especially due to the implications of a 
pandemic on empirical research, and because re-socialization into a powerful group is common, I 
refocused my area of study to be centered around the conception of the ‘self’ more broadly 
within these powerful groups. When referencing powerful groups, I mean types of organizations 
that insist upon affecting the individual’s identity. This includes cults, or New Religious 
Movements (NRMs), but can be further extended to other areas of interest, such as fraternities 
and sororities, collectively known as Greek Life because these institutions fit into a framework 
for an organization that encourages its members to think of themselves as a collective as opposed 
to individuals—changing the way members see him/her/themselves.    
 To effectively study the self, it’s important to first understand why this thesis is based in 
the sociological perspective as well as to take a look at available sociological theories of self. 
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Sociology, or the study of society, differs from psychology, or the study of how individuals think 
and behave, because sociology can encompass structural, cultural, group, as well as individual 
interaction. In popular culture, we often refer to, and think of, the ‘self’ as being a natural or 
essential phenomenon; we don’t think of our ‘selves’ as having social implications or as being an 
ongoing project, although we interact with others using our identities every single day. While 
psychology is important to understanding the ‘self’ because it gives preliminary understanding to 
the ‘self’ as an object and is even included in aspects of theory introduced in later chapters, 
sociology is the primary lens used in this thesis. Sociology connects the individual back to the 
external context, providing a greater range of theory and adding social dynamics to the ‘self’ that 
would not be possible using psychology alone—this includes, but isn’t limited to, examining 
individual level social interactions, examining the social and political structure of the powerful 
group, and analyzing how emotions impact interaction and identity.  
This thesis will use different sociological theories on the ‘self’ to examine the above 
elements, beginning with a chapter on classical sociological theory on the self, followed by a 
chapter on contemporary sociological theory, a chapter on dramaturgical and related theories, 
and ending with a chapter focused on the sociological examination of emotions. This thesis is 
primarily a theory project, with some speculation as to how this theory could be applied in these 
given contexts (NRMs and Greek Life). This thesis does not make use of sociology’s other set of 
tools –systematic empirical analysis, though it provides guidance for such potential explorations.  
Finally, the last step in introducing this Thesis is to introduce preliminary background 
information related to New Religious Movements and Greek Life. In popular culture, New 
Religious Movements, due to significant loss of membership in more mainstream religions, have 
become increasingly more sought out (Melton 1995:271). The significance of cults 
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(academically known as New Religious Movements) is based on society’s reaction to them—
starting with arguably, the most influential cult, Jonestown (Melton 1995: 271). Jonestown has 
been widely used as a template for understanding New Religious Movements (Crockford 
2018:96). Thus, because of Jonestown’s reputation, cultural and social perceptions of cults were 
“fueled by fear of what they might do,” based on Jonestown’s dark past (Melton 1995:276). 
Jonestown was derived from the founder, Jones’, belief that, “In 1965, after reading an article on 
nuclear destruction in Esquire Magazine, …the end of the world in a nuclear holocaust would 
occur on 15 July 1967. Concerned for the society that would emerge after this event, he sought to 
find sanctuary for a small, interracial remnant” (Smith 1982:106). Jones moved his congregation, 
known as The People’s Temple, to Guyana initially for ‘safety reasons’. However, it was there 
that the ‘White Night’ occurred, “an event that had been previously rehearsed, [which executed] 
the suicide of every member of Peoples Temple in Jonestown. When it was over, 914 people had 
died, most by taking a fruit drink mixed with cyanide and tranquilizers; most apparently died 
voluntarily” (Smith 1982:108). “Jonestown is the archetype for other cults,” insinuating that 
other NRMs will have the same fate, suggesting cults are no longer harmless, but potentially 
fatal organizations (Crockford 2018:96). As a result, the term ‘cult’ has three thematic features: 
A charismatic leader, whose members are isolated from their former lives, and is a group that 
utilizes ‘brain-washing’ or re-socialization techniques (Crockford 2018:95); Furthermore, cults, 
or NRMs, typically have “first-generation enthusiasms, unambiguous clarity and certainty in 
belief systems, urgency of message, commitment to a different lifestyle, strong them versus us 
and or before and after joining distinctions” (Melton 1995: 266). Cults are related to the self, and 
thus necessary to study in this Thesis, because upon joining, their identities become intertwined 
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with the group; individuals are seeking social connectedness and a sense of belonging which 
ultimately impacts one’s sense of self (Coates 2012a:170).  
Greek life, however, is simpler to discuss because it is particularly salient to American 
culture, especially in higher education. As opposed to the way sororities and fraternities are 
portrayed in television and film, additional elements of Greek Life will be discussed further 
along in this thesis. Sororities and fraternities are a part of Inter-Fraternity Councils and National 
Panhellenic Organizations that help maintain the responsibility of leadership and act as a liaison 
between the University and the organization. Sororities and fraternities all utilize a hierarchy 
model within their organization as well, relying primarily on elected or appointed leaders to 
guide their respective chapters. These organizations are not unique from cults or NRMs in that 
they are ritualistic, historical, and occupy their own sub-cultures with certain typical 
demographics of members. While NRMs are often perceived as societal outsiders, Greek life is 
just the opposite; the power yielded from Greek Life is that its members are often more affluent 
and can have a very influential impact on the culture of a college, let alone the powerful social 
contacts that are reserved for former members. Although NRMs and Greek Life form powerful 
groups in different ways, they each provide an important perspective to the conception of the self 










     CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
The focus of this thesis is to provide a theoretical framework with which we can examine 
how we, as individuals, understand the conception of our ‘selves’ in the context of powerful 
groups. By powerful groups, I mean types of organizations that insist upon affecting, and 
actively changing, the individual’s personal identity. This includes New Religious Movements 
and can be further extended to other areas of interest, such as Greek Life.  
New Religious Movements, known in popular culture as cults, are religious sects that can 
be identified as "deviant religious organizations with novel beliefs and subcultures" (Crockford 
2018:24). It is widely known that “new recruits undergo an identity change process as to align 
their previous sense of self or identity with the group ‘identity’” in hopes of finding a sense of 
belonging (Coates 2013b:272). As new members are negotiating these new relationships, they 
form social bonds and an entirely new social network—transitioning into a new social role than 
they previously occupied in broader society. Individuals undergo what is referred to as self-
change, or “changes in behaviors or social relationships, but can also refer to changes that are 
‘deeper’ and emotional in nature” (Coates 2013b:273). Thus, NRMs provide a plethora of 
opportunity to examine identity negotiations further.  
College and University Greek organizations include a vast array of sororities or 
fraternities on their prospective college campuses. These organizations are stereotypically known 
for their cult-like rituals, expensive membership costs, social hierarchies, gossip, close-knit 
relationships, Greek letter affiliations, and social gatherings. Greek organizations serve as a 
funnel for maintaining the status quo in the college setting as well as providing access for certain 
individuals to a sense of validation, belonging, and a greater social network. While they don’t 
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typically separate themselves from broader society like NRMs, Greek organizations still hold an 
unbelievable amount of power over their respective sorority and fraternity members and are 
deserving of the title, powerful group.  
Sociological theory suggests that identity is developed in the midst of and featured at the 
forefront of individual level interactions. Therefore, to understand a self, that is heavily engaged 
with a powerful group, we must draw on theory grounded in symbolic interaction, or social 
interaction based on the creation of shared meaning from symbols. This body of theory 
emphasizes a micro-sociological focus on interactions, but also considers structural and cultural 
challenges that inevitably affect and influence the individual and these interactions. 
 This chapter will explain how sociologists conceptualize the self, beginning with the 
earliest sociological theory on the self as a foundation. Although psychology is often used to 
examine the self, the differences between psychology and sociology are necessary to highlight 
because, while society (and inherently the study of psychology) tends to understand the self as a 
basic unit for social interaction—without paying much attention to the ways in which the self 
develops and what it is affected by—sociology emphasizes the ‘identity work’ and social nature 
of the self that goes into negotiating and re-negotiating identities. While some contemporary 
theory on the self, to be discussed in further detail in the next chapter, utilizes psychological 
concepts, the sociological perspective is unique, and best fit for this thesis, because it provides a 
cultural component: It lets us closely examine how social (and in this case religious) practices 
can, and do, significantly affect self-worth, self-esteem, emotional management, motivate group 
involvement and participation, and dictate an individual’s lived experience.  
 Firstly, classical theory written by Charles Horton Cooley needs to be examined because 
Cooley is able to give this thesis insight into a more complicated way to think about what it 
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means to have a consciousness. His theory is guided by some of the oldest and most basic 
principles of sociology, yet it still remains useful for new sociological material by relating these 
concepts to other realms of social life, sympathy and biology. 
Cooley, who provides a basis of context for Mead’s ‘self’, suggests that we are 
influenced heavily by others while similarly sending out “influences of our own” ([1902] 
2012:165). We are constantly changing our perception based on our surroundings; it is these 
surroundings which guide our creation and expression of our ‘selves’. Cults, or New Religious 
Movements, then can be seen as key players in the development of individual self and identity. 
Individuals who become part of a NRM become of the collective mindset, shaped by the 
presence of a charismatic leader with a message requiring immediacy. There are countless 
examples in New Religious Movement history and literature that suggest that the individual 
members will often cite the group benefit or well-being over their own when asked why they 
endured certain abuses or trouble.  
Cooley ([1902] 2012) also suggests that our “social consciousness is inseparable from our 
self-consciousness” (166). We cannot disconnect our individual selves from the presence of 
some social group and it is because of this that we participate in sympathetic introspection— this 
process "…allows others to awake in [themselves] a life similar…” to that of the individual 
(Cooley [1902] 2012:167). Our ‘sympathetic introspection’ leaves us vulnerable to envy; we 
desire membership to a powerful group because it gives us insight to a ‘similar life’ that we see 
through our socialization. We desire these connections to continue to develop our ‘selves’. 
Cooley ([1902] 2012) says that society is inherently “a social organism” with which a “living 
whole” survives by the phases of consciousness of individuals and a collective (168).  
 10 
The three components of consciousness according to Cooley ([1902] 2012) are the self, 
which “thinks of the self,” the social consciousness which “in an individual aspect is what we 
think of others,” and the public consciousness which “is the collective view” of the whole (168). 
The inability of the self to separate from the social, and the social from the public, gives us a 
unique lens with which to interpret and understand the public consciousness that becomes an 
identifying feature of the cult itself as well as the public’s reaction to the cult. It is these 
influences that take root as particular attitudes that become so pervasive into this public, social, 
and self-consciousness.  
 The second classical theorist on the ‘self’ is George Herbert Mead. Mead must be the 
second theorist whose work we examine in this chapter, because his work includes a 
foundational element of symbolic interactionism, the sociological theory lens used in this thesis, 
which will be further examined by Blumer. He is able to successfully articulate the social 
relationship that makes up the self—the ‘I’ versus the ‘me’, which will continue to come into 
play in later chapters.  
Mead suggests that “the self develops into an individual as a result of…others” ([1934] 
2012:347). Mead argues that the self is “distinguished between the self and body” because even 
if we lose parts of the body, this isn’t necessarily true for the self ([1934] 2012:348). Mead 
further articulates this concept by expressing that we are made up of different personalities 
connected in one—we act differently depending on our relationships to others. We mean “one 
thing to one man and another thing to another” (Mead [1934] 2012:351). Mead helps us 
understand that we “organize our ‘self’ with reference to our community” in which we are a part 
([1934] 2012:352). 
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We often think of the ‘self’ with reference to the group because we identify ourselves 
primarily as fitting within said group. Our thoughts, feelings, and even our morals, are linked 
from the ‘me’ to the ‘I’, because these attitudes often dictate the way in which we think, feel, and 
behave, since we see ourselves both as subjects and objects. Mead’s most defining point, 
however, is that we tend to “respond to the attitudes of others” in terms of ‘I’, with reference to 
ourselves, and adopt the “attitudes of others [for ourselves]” ([1934] 2012:358). This suggests 
that there is a difference between the me and the I; the me is a social identity, occupying the 
learned social behaviors and norms and adopting these into the identity, while the I is much more 
impulsive, not necessarily acting with regard to the social environment (Mead [1934] 2012:358). 
This relates to Mead’s “generalized other,” or perception of others’ responses towards ourselves 
shaping how we will react and behave in a social setting ([1934] 2012:358). This perception no 
doubt plays a role in an individual’s membership to a powerful group, just as it does in everyday 
life.  This suggests that individuals re-envision the world they live in with the social context in 
mind; we further develop who we are through social interactions—because interpreting others 
allows us to do so to ourselves (Mead [1934] 2012:348).  
Mead is uniquely apt to understanding New Religious Movement and Greek Life 
participation because, upon joining and learning the ropes of said group, we begin to see 
ourselves as a member of the group and not purely as an individual. We seek approval, 
community, connection, mutual understanding, and the like—which we can find, should we so 
choose, in structured organizations like cults and Greek life. We conceptualize how we want to 
interact with society by understanding the nature of ‘I’ versus ‘me’. Once we do, we are able to 
adopt the ‘attitudes’ of others as our own—into the me. While we are still acting independently 
and impulsively as an ‘I’, the ‘me’ is the version of ourselves that adopts the new social 
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atmosphere we have joined. The ‘me’ is the self we think of in terms of our surroundings. The 
ability of the ‘self’ to be flexible, both in expression and in perception, allows the ‘self’ to evolve 
and become united within a bigger group. This is pertinent to New Religious Movements and 
Greek Life in particular because both organizations have a particular ‘attitude’ or set of values 
and practices that are unique to the group and its members. These attitudes are so unwaveringly 
strong that the individual’s identity becomes embedded within the attitudes of the collective.  
 Blumer is the third and final classical theorist necessary to the integrity of this 
preliminary chapter about the self. Blumer helps to clearly delineate the theory of symbolic 
interactionism even further; he lays the foundation for future theorists in other chapters to help 
guide our understanding of more contemporary sociological theory, found in chapter 2, as well as 
dramaturgical theory found in chapter 3.  
Blumer, a disciple of Mead, builds onto him quite closely, while trying to formalize 
Mead’s lessons. Blumer ([1969] 2012) tells us that individuals are active components of the 
social atmosphere, not passive ones. We have autonomy in the decisions we make as ‘selves’—
humans are not solely existing at the whims of institutions. Blumer would suggest that it is 
individuals who choose to partake in the system, whatever the system may be. This includes sub-
systems (with unique sub-cultures) which have their own ‘total institution’ feel, much like Greek 
Life or New Religious Movements. It is not just structural societal influences that have pushed a 
passive ‘self’ to pursue this type of organization. This is primarily because “human beings can be 
the object of their own actions” which helps identify what it means to have a conscious ‘self’ 
(Blumer [1969] 2012:251). He points this out via a critique of “most sociologists” of his era 
(notably, those in the Structural Functionalist tradition) who refer to society without referring to 
the individual and his/her/their actions in the context, but by referencing “acts which have been 
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done to them” in the context of an organization or institution of which they have no perceived 
influence or control (Blumer [1969] 2012:253). We form our own actions based on “interpreting 
situations and developing symbols” which we can use in future interactions based on what we 
learned from previous situations (Blumer [1969] 2012:254). Members of New Religious 
Movements are a great example of this theory in action because they help show how individuals 
come to develop new symbols from their time in these totalizing institutions, a concept which 
will be further developed in later chapters. It is the hallmark of these institutions that they create 
symbols with which the individuals can interpret the world, which by definition is the meaning 
of symbolic interactionism. Even more importantly, this interpretation of the world is unique to 
the framing of the NRM or Greek organization, framing the way in which individuals will 
choose to interact and inherently empowering the strength of the organization further. Blumer 
argues that we have the power to define our actions based on these interpretations of our social 
environments and that we are not merely existing while we wait for structural or systematic 
changes to be instituted that will affect our actions and re-actions.  
By tracing the classical theory on the self, starting with Cooley, then Mead, and finally 
Blumer, this chapter provides a fundamental understanding of the self from the sociological 
perspective—to determine that there is a difference between symbolic interactionism and the 
common psychological perception of the ‘self’ that is spoken about in common conversation. 
Moreover, this chapter has attempted to show the evolution of preliminary sociological theory of 
the self via the most important elements of these theories, beginning with an explanation of 
different forms of consciousness from Cooley, continuing with an examination of individuals’ 
use of the ‘I’ and the ‘me’ to navigate social life (Mead), and finally ending with Blumer’s active 
(as opposed to passive) nature of individuals in navigating social spaces. These early theories 
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provide insight on the chosen cases of interest, cults or NRMs and Greek Life, to explain how 
sociologists understand the self in relation to these powerful groups and build a foundation for 
























 This contemporary theory on the self, as opposed to the classical theory on the ‘self’ first 
introduced in Chapter 1, is vastly more complicated, because it introduces new ways to think 
about this same ‘self’; the theorists in this chapter argue that there is a complex interworking of 
social institutions and individuals that impacts the construction and management of self—which 
includes an infusion with different social roles that complicate the question of having and 
identifying one’s ‘core self’. This chapter will build upon and acknowledge that the basis of this 
understanding is grounded in microsociology by asking the following questions: What is a ‘core 
self’ and how does the contemporary understanding of ‘self’ help navigate a discussion about the 
‘core self’? Who or what, in our modern theory ignites, motivates, and emphasizes the 
understanding of a core self? Furthermore, what kind of ‘selves’ are there?  Who or what is 
involved in this contemporary construction of ‘self’? And finally, how can we use these 
complicated theories to make sense of membership in powerful groups? 
 Selfhood, according to McCall and Simmons, is when an individual “begins to act toward 
himself similarly to how he acts toward other people” (1978:52). A role relates to a “line of 
action” of a character, while a character relates to “a person with distinctive personal 
characteristics” (McCall and Simmons 1978:56). We must utilize role to get to character—“we 
must choose a role and perform it in an expressive manner of that role if we are to become 
persons and have character” (McCall and Simmons 1978:57).  A person’s identity comes from 
both—these identities “serve as the rungs on which social identities and personal biographies can 
be hung” (McCall and Simmons 1978:62). An individual needs a personal identity in order to be 
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recognized, and once recognized by others, establish stable social relationships (McCall and 
Simmons 1978:63).  
In effect, this way of identifying people enables us to “categorize each other according to 
our social positions,” of which these expectations then constitute social roles (McCall and 
Simmons 1978:64). Social roles of some kind are expected. While it is unexpected that we join a 
cult per se, it has become commonplace for college students to take part in Fraternity or Sorority 
Life. Moreover, there has even become an affiliated status with this group, suggesting that it has 
become such a sought after social role. Being initiated as a member of a sorority or fraternity 
often equates to a prestigious personal identity and immediate social bonds that come from being 
someone’s ‘brother’ or ‘sister’. Furthermore, we categorize one another dependent upon the 
social roles individuals occupy: If you are a member of a cult or a NRM, even though you are 
often hidden from the rest of the society, you are still categorized as a member by outsiders, 
insiders, and yourself.  
In order to address the above questions, it is necessary to envision what it means to have 
‘selfhood’—or a concentration of different roles that form, in our individual personal 
perspectives, the most important inner essence of one’s self—and how this ‘selfhood’ allows us 
to adopt different social roles—or the building blocks of our identities as they pertain to our 
social lives. Social roles, for example, can be our defining familial roles, or related to our 
positions in the workplace; they’re important because they signify our values to others based on 
the social conception of that role. The way we are perceived by others (and the lives we lead as a 
result) is directly influenced by the way we see ourselves—making the contemporary self a 
priority in everyday life. 
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Furthermore, our study of the self is not so simple as to merely acknowledge that our 
social roles are inherently connected to our identity (in other words, our sense of self), but we 
must also recognize that there are multiple social roles that we have access to and must choose 
from daily—i.e. there is an important distinction between roles that form a hierarchy of role 
identities. This hierarchy of roles, all occupied by the same person, is reminiscent of Mead 
because he is the first to suggest that we do highlight different personalities in different social 
circumstances. The hierarchy of role identities, each of which has influence on the other, 
depends on prominence and a cost/benefit analysis of what the individual can gain depending on 
what identity they are utilizing, which is called the “perceived opportunity structure” (McCall 
and Simmons 1978:73). It may make sense for an individual to join Greek Life on a college 
campus because of the perceived benefits, friends, invitations to parties, access to other groups 
who are similarly involved, status and prestige affiliated with the organization, access to student 
leadership, etc. However, in order to confirm one’s sense of self, individuals need role support 
that they can only find from other people (McCall and Simmons 1978:71). Role support is a 
“precious commodity” because it must be maintained, which we accomplish through forming 
interpersonal relationships which become increasingly valuable and harder to break as we get 
closer to one another in our relationships (McCall and Simmons 1978:168). Role support is 
especially crucial in powerful groups like cults or Greek organizations because the group 
dynamic reinforces an in-group, out-group mentality; there are elements of secrecy to ritual, 
meetings, and knowledge within the group that is not meant to be public to others outside of this 
inner circle.  
When we find these intrinsic problems with our identities that are not being supported by 
others, we begin to “change the content of our role identities and rearrange our hierarchy” 
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(McCall and Simmons 1978:196). But when we do this, we change our versions and conceptions 
of our selves too (McCall and Simmons 1978:220). This, in part, comes from our external social 
expectations which reinforce the need to achieve these ideal role identities; what’s even more 
important, though, is that our “self-expectations form the link between individuals and our social 
environment” (McCall and Simmons 1978:90). Self-expectations and social expectations can 
often be the fuel, or motivation, with which we attempt to join such powerful groups. Without 
these, we would be much less likely to find these totalizing institutions so appealing. We would 
not be asking ourselves what this group can do for our identities, because, without social 
pressure, this wouldn’t be important.  
Additionally, theorists Gecas and Burke introduce the ‘self-concept’ theory, which helps 
compliment the theory of social roles and role identity hierarchy envisioned by McCall and 
Simmons. Self-concept is the notion that individuals have a “sum total of the individual's 
thoughts and feelings about him/herself,” which can come from the formation of a role identity 
hierarchy (Gecas and Burke 1995:42). This is important because it dictates a theory that gives 
credence to a ‘core self’, or a compilation of all of these identities to form what we, ourselves as 
individuals, recognize to be the most important element of our ‘selves’. When studied in addition 
to McCall and Simmons’ theory of role identity hierarchy, these theories suggest that individuals 
have the capacity to develop an understanding of him/her/themselves holistically, not merely 
relying on the separation of each social role or on the most important social role (whichever is 
currently at the top of the hierarchy) to mimic the conception of the self.  
Gecas and Burke draw on Mead as they suggest that “identities are social fictions created 
out of this symbolic milieu, but they are highly valued fictions having real consequences for the 
interactants and the course of the interaction. Money, power, love, esteem, or other resources 
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may be at stake” (1995:43). Gecas and Burke are founded in Mead’s theory of social 
organization, meaning that the self is referenced with the external community in mind. These 
motivating factors are often what encourage individuals to seek changes to their self-concept, 
resulting in joining powerful groups that they can use to effectively embody new identities. This 
is an extraordinary example of the unique components that help to create contemporary theory on 
the self—because what this theory highlights is that the self has very real social, economic, and 
even political implications which can affect the future reality of the person who personifies that 
self.  
Additionally, Gecas and Burke introduce the study of self-efficacy because “one needs to 
ask when one's self-appraisals depend on others' appraisals” and how these appraisals affect the 
understanding of the self (1995:51). The most relevant instances of such include “when one's 
motive in self-presentation is to impress others, either as a means of gaining resources or to raise 
one's self-esteem” especially in a group setting (Gecas and Burke 1995:51). Impressing others 
for self-esteem can be as simple as flaunting membership to a sorority or fraternity by wearing 
the Greek letters affiliated with them around the campus, or by involving oneself in the 
leadership of an NRM to gain the approval of other members or other influencing leaders. Other 
people have such a strong effect on one’s self-concept because one depends on their approval.  
 It is important to acknowledge “the active, selective, and protective nature of the self in 
its relationship to various social environments” (Gecas and Burke 1995:53). This is unique to 
powerful groups because the members form a relationship that resembles a familial connection, 
like that of a religious group or ‘sisterhood’ or ‘brotherhood’ in Greek Life. Gecas and Burke 
suggest that “self-esteem is most affected by interpersonal relations with family, friends, and 
one’s local community” (Gecas and Burke 1995:53), meaning that who we surround ourselves 
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with really does matter. Gecas and Burke link sociological theory with psychological theory, 
allowing us to identify how and when self-esteem can interact with one’s social environment to 
impact one’s self-conception in our modern world. Much of the understanding of identity and 
self-esteem or respect, especially for individuals who are the least fortunate among a society, 
originates “a sense of self-worth or personal significance and that its accessibility depends in part 
on the roles available to us” like what is suggested by both Goffman and McCall and Simmons 
(Snow and Anderson 1987:1339).  
Snow and Anderson are instrumental in highlighting the importance of identity talk in the 
development of an individual’s identity or sense of self. Identity work, according to Snow and 
Anderson, is “the range of activities individuals engage in to create, present, and sustain personal 
identities that are congruent with and supportive of the self-concept” as it was introduced by 
Gecas and Burke (1987:1348). They use data from interviews with homeless persons to explore 
the ways that identity talk can be used to mitigate stigma. In their study, homeless individuals 
use ‘identity talk’ in a manner of forms, including, “ distancing, and embracement” (Snow and 
Anderson 1987:1348). Examples of identity talk in action include embracing the role an 
individual occupies (in this study it was homelessness) or distancing oneself from the negatives 
of said role to avoid identifying within it. Furthermore, fictive story-telling is utilized by both 
NRMs and Greek Life. NRMs often intrigue potential members by piecing together information 
to create a new version of an old truth: Jehovah’s Witnesses follow a ‘new’ version of the Bible, 
The New Translation, one that has been re-written to exclude or include certain stories to re-tell a 
version of Christianity that benefits their group (Knox 2011:164). Identity talk, according to 
Snow and Anderson in their study of homeless persons, can incorporate role-distancing, a 
strategy first identified by MCcall and Simmons. In the homeless persons study, they find that 
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“[the homeless] sounded at times much like middle-class citizens berating welfare recipients role 
distancing involves an active and self-conscious attempt to foster the impression of a lack of 
commitment or attachment to a particular role in order to deny the virtual self-implied” (Snow 
and Anderson 1987:1350). The participants distanced themselves from characteristics of 
homeless persons that they didn’t identify with themselves or thought was beneath them, 
signaling a need to maintain their perceived self-worth. Distancing, and other strategies, are used 
when one “finds himself cast into or enacting a role in which the social identity implied is 
inconsistent with the desired or actual self-conception” (Snow and Anderson 1987:1350). This 
also applies when an actual identity is inconsistent with an individual’s ideal version of the same 
identity (thereby existing an inconsistency in role identities within the hierarchy), because “the 
social identities lodged in [roles available to them in the workplace] are frequently inconsistent 
with the desired or idealized self-conceptions of some of the homeless” resulting in their 
dissociation from work they don’t see as being equitable to their idealized selves, which will be 
examined in more detail later on in this chapter (Snow and Anderson 1987:1351).  
NRMs and Greek Life members utilize both strategies when attempting to go through 
sorority or fraternity recruitment for example. Individuals will distance themselves from certain 
stereotypical features of organizations they do not wish to join, in hopes of seeming more 
appealing to others. Additionally, certain fraternities and sororities have been known to 
selectively engage in socials solely with those of their ‘same social strata’. Embracing one’s role 
in an NRM, for instance, is one way to confirm an individual’s identity in this group. It is a 
manner of convincing oneself that they ‘belong’, as well as countering negative perceptions of 
these groups from others. Some members, when considering leaving the group they have known 
to be their chosen family, will actively attempt to engage and involve themselves further in the 
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group as an attempt to save their identities as cult members. The “direct rewards of membership, 
like friendship, belonging, higher self-esteem, religious experience, personal identity” encourage 
members to fight for their membership because it reflects upon their self-hood (Coates 
2012a:179).  
Additionally, we must take a closer look at the different types of selves that are 
introduced by these theorists, beginning with the ‘gloried self’.  The ‘gloried self’, or the media 
self, introduced by Adler and Adler, arises when individuals become the focus of intense 
interpersonal and media attention, leading to their achieving celebrity status” and changing their 
conceptions of self to meet the demands and expectations of the version of themselves portrayed 
in the media (1989:299). A "public persona" is created, usually by the media, which differs from 
individuals' private personas”, much like Goffman’s theory of performance, or the attempt to put 
on different facades for others (Adler and Adler 1989:299). This happens because heightened 
media portrayals often “causes individuals to objectify their selves to themselves” (Adler and 
Adler 1989:299). Eventually, individuals become “alienated from themselves through the 
separation of their self-concept from the conception of their selves held by others” (Adler and 
Adler 1989:299). The best example of a ‘gloried self’ that is easily recognizable in popular 
culture about cults (NRMs) or Greek life, is David Koresh, the founder and leader of the Branch 
Davidians. Koresh was popularized in the media during the 51-day siege of the compound by 
federal agents; he was glamorized and vilified, to the point in which there was a distinct change 
in his behaviors and approach to the tragedy (Dowdle and Dowdle 2018). He became the image 
that was portrayed in the media, leaving key elements of his former self behind and ultimately, 
leading to the downfall of the movement and its people. The separation of self-concept is 
reminiscent of Gecas and Burke, as it further supports the necessity of the self-concept theory.  
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Franks and Marolla insist on the importance of self-esteem in maintaining social 
connectedness as well as individuality in identity (1976:325). Franks and Marolla articulate 
identity theory from the point of view of both inner and outer self-esteem—which is 
conceptualized as the process of “the reflected appraisals of significant others in one's social 
environment in the form of social approval and the individual's feelings of efficacy and 
competence derived from his own perceptions of the effects he has on his environment” 
(1976:325). Inner self-esteem is derived from “the experience of self as an active agent of 
making things actually happen and realizing one's intents in an impartial world,” while outer 
self-esteem is described as being “bestowed by others” and not by the self (Franks and Marolla 
1976:326). Franks and Marolla’s outer self-esteem concept relates easily back to social 
expectations and motives; embracing a group for its benefits to one’s identity comes from 
positive outer self-esteem based on the membership in said group.  
Franks and Marolla suggest that one’s “actions and consequences are materials out of 
which knowledge is built” rather than a passive mirroring of fixed stimuli (1976:329). Both 
allow focus on what “symbolically equipped persons teach themselves in addition to that which 
is learned by the passive incorporation of purely verbal symbols initiated from situated others” 
(Franks and Marolla 1976:329). Symbols can and are often introduced in these powerful groups 
to facilitate a stronger inner and outer self-esteem as it relates to that particular group. For 
instance, the rituals involved in Greek Life and NRMs create shared meaning that is unique to 
their particular group. Sorority and fraternity initiation involves members learning shared secrets, 
wearing or not wearing letters, wearing particular colors or robes, and reciting verbal symbols. 
This relates to their understanding and incorporation of Mead’s ‘generalized other’, because they 
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utilize this component to create their dualized version of self-esteem, coming from both the inner 
self and the perceived outer self, which is further commented on by Stryker and Burke.  
The introduction of an inner and outer self suggests that there is a transition in theory 
from primarily internal phenomenon in social interactions to the presence of more perceived 
structural boundaries. These structural boundaries begin to have a greater influence on the 
conception of the self.  Particularly because of the “consequences of identity ties… and resulting 
identity salience” and significance to individuals (Stryker and Burke 2000:287). Stryker and 
Burke establish the importance of behavior and character in identity maintenance by questioning 
how self-meanings relate to the meanings of one’s behavior in the context of one’s social 
interactions (Stryker and Burke 2000:287). Burke and Stryker rely on the concept of an ‘identity 
standard’, the perceptions of an individual’s meanings for symbolism in interactions, the 
individual’s behavior, and the comparator between the standard and his/her/their perceptions to 
establish the subjectivity of one’s identity through self-verification (2000:288). This article 
includes the functionality of social structural sources (or behavior) and internal cognitive 
processes (or internalized perceptions) to understand the salience of identities in a world of 
complex social interconnectedness—as there are multiple identities and roles that are shared by 
the same person (Stryker and Burke 2000:289). When these identities are put to the test in the 
practicality of the real world, the individual must rely on these interactions to either confirm or 
deny the successfulness of his/her/their perception of their role(s) as it compares to the standard 
(which is established and maintained by society) for that role, which in turn reflects the salience 
of the particular identity in question (Stryker and Burke 2000:290). For instance, because one’s 
identity as a ‘sister’ or a ‘brother’ in their respective Greek organization is easily comparable, 
since there are many other members, this identity is often being compared and contrasted with 
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other members. If an individual, comparatively, is not living up to the duties and responsibilities 
of brotherhood or sisterhood, said individual is likely to reconsider the salience of that identity, 
meaning it will be less influential to the ‘core self’ than another, more beneficial identity. 
Moreover, the individual will be likely to consider, if not actually, leave said group. Stryker and 
Burke’s work implies the “social structure’s dependence on the functionality of identities” 
(2000:291). This further reiterates to society that we need to build, maintain, and utilize multiple 
identities to establish our person-hood. 
Gubrium and Holstein suggest that there has been a historical shift in complexity of 
institutions, or external context for the self, resulting in a shift in selfhood. Because of our high 
involvement in the modern world, Gubrium and Holstein suggest that “No single discursive 
determines who and what we are.environment  In today’s world, diverse the individual has 
degree, one can choose the environment(s) in which some  Toconstruction. -selffor options 
s we have the same or we have the option to join a group just a ”,self will be constitutedone’s 
106). Gubrium and Holstein 2000:( option to deny ourselves membership to a powerful group
ot n“such that However, the issue lies in a lack of equity between opportunities of individuals, 
” (Gubrium and Holstein same field of possibilitiesthe to to or has access subjected is everyone 
opportunities may appear to be a building -108). For those with more privileges, “self2000:
while the less advantaged are more likely to be selectively filtered identities, of smorgasbord 
homeless such as  resortof last  concernsgoing processing of constructive -self thethrough 
108).2000:shelters and prisons” (Gubrium and Holstein   
While Gubrium and Holstein recognize economic gaps in opportunity, this could also be 
applied to an all-encompassing membership, or a membership to a group that excludes an 
individual from access to joining another. For instance, individuals in cults can be restricted from 
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membership to other religious organizations, or to any organizations that oppose the values of 
the institution. Although sororities and fraternities are not institutions that control their members 
completely, their members are undoubtedly coming from a select pool of potential new 
members: there are economic dispositions that must be met in order for students to attend 
university in the first place, as well as the added financial responsibility of members to pay for 
their dues.  What these authors want to pinpoint, however, is that “we need to consider the 
myriad and Holstein  overlapping, intersecting going concerns that shape the self” (Gubrium
111).2000:  Because of our ties to all of these ‘discursive environments’, “ construction is -self
111). They want to remind us that 2000:beyond personal control” (Gubrium and Holstein now 
 withus supply that going concerns  of the eminently variegated out the social is also built “
112). 2000:identities” (Gubrium and Holstein  
 Contemporary theory of the self is new and innovative, compared to the foundational 
understanding of the self that was first introduced by Cooley, Mead, and Blumer in Chapter 1. 
Yet, this contemporary theory retains a particular attachment to symbolism and the creation of 
shared meaning; this is how we communicate in our shared social world. Most importantly, this 
chapter contributes a condensed version of several influential contemporary sociological theories 
of the self, including that of the role hierarchy model, self-concept, identity-talk, inner and outer 
self-esteem, identity-salience, and going concerns models of self-construction and identity 
navigation. These theories, all together, serve as a guide with which we can compare and contrast 
the foundation of the sociological self with how we conceptualize a self in modern day, 
especially as a part of a NRM or member of Greek Life on a college campus. This chapter 
suggests that certain theories animate a core self and that this core self is augmented by different 
types of selves, the idealized self, the fallible self, and the gloried self, all of which can be made 
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examples of in Cult culture and FSL (Fraternity and Sorority Life). This chapter begins with an 
explanation of ‘selfhood’ and how that contributes to an individual’s ability to navigate both 
his/her/their personal expectations as well as societal expectations for group membership. 
Throughout this chapter, the reader will find direct connections from theories to applied material 
as well as what strategies inherent in these theories can be utilized to construct dimensions of a 





















     CHAPTER THREE 
 
 This chapter will explore the perception of the self as a social performance and 
provide a new lens with which we can view conceptions of the self. Goffman is leading figure in 
the sociology of the self at the symbolic interaction level, as he conceptualizes an individual in a 
group setting through what we think of dramaturgy and performance. Goffman’s theory of 
performance, put forth in the book The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), gives 
further insight on individual level interaction and connects to greater themes such as social roles, 
identity work, and the ability for powerful groups to emphasize and institutionalize social norms 
within their organizations. The theories inside this chapter can provide a more complete picture 
of an individual paying very close attention to how he is perceived, as well as the constraints that 
come with membership in a powerful group.  
The basis of this theory, Goffman suggests, is that each individual participant acts as a 
performer, in order to manipulate a situation (social interaction) so that it fits into an acceptable 
form of the “working consensus,” or agreed upon negotiation between individuals (1959:10). He 
describes the many tools at the disposal of the performer to create his/her performance which 
he/she pushes outward onto the rest of society in any given context. The performer will utilize 
setting, a part of his/her chosen front, “or expressive equipment intentionally or unintentionally 
utilized by an individual in a performance” (Goffman 1959:22). The setting of the interactions of 
a group as a private and membership oriented such as a cult is necessary because it reflects the 
intentions of said group. The concept of using setting for performance is best exemplified in 
models of New Religious Movements, because these groups tend to create, facilitate, and spread 
their message when in seclusion and inside the physical, collective space of a commune. The 
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‘social front,’ or environment, is “abstract and general,” but over time will “become 
institutionalized in terms of a stereotypical expectation” for said role or performance—which 
allows for the normalization of practices within said group (Goffman 1959:26). A ‘social front’ 
is based on the common agreement to uphold the performance—like ritual attire (including robes 
and pins for sororities and fraternities) as well as certain prescribed dialogue that is reserved for 
members and differentiates between those included and excluded from the organization; in a 
New Religious Movement, or Greek Life, these fronts act as the gateway to  a unique social 
agenda and set of norms that individual members must master in order to be assimilated into 
their new society.  
The symbolic interactionist perspective of social interaction as performance enables 
sociologists to better comprehend the negotiation between the self and broader society. 
Performers utilize “secret consumption,” or engaging in private acts apart from the group that do 
not measure up to the image the individual means to portray, in order to deceive or conceal 
information, effort, or other ideals from his/her audience (Goffman 1959:42). The prototype for 
deceit in a social context is none other than NRM leaders; they’re known for their charisma and 
ability to pull people into their inner circle but are also known for personal acts of scandal that 
often come to light later (Crockford 2018:95). Thus, it is inevitable that members encounter 
inconsistencies with the front that is presented, leading to a more complicated dramaturgical 
experience for both leaders and members. Moreover, performers also fall victim to “proposing a 
closer relationship to our audience” than already exists, by which they will fraternize with the 
audience suggesting an inauthentic relationship (Goffman 1959:48). This is seen predominantly 
in social groups with perceived closeness but internal conflicts, e.g. Greek Life. Fraternities and 
sororities are known for their clique-y tendencies; performers within the organization will likely 
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claim to be closer to all of their brothers or sisters, when in reality, the gossip can be 
insurmountable. There is a difference between sincere and inauthentic, or cynical, performances, 
leading us as observers to question when the individual is a true believer in his/her/their 
performance and when they are aware of their own front (Goffman 1959:16). When a 
performance is authentic, the individual’s conception of him or herself matches the particular 
performance; however, when it is inauthentic or cynical, the individual sees this particular 
interaction as a performance—meaning they are fully aware of the setting, manner, and 
predisposition of their person. Furthermore, we, as performers, suffer from “incompatible 
impressions” which subject our version of reality to skepticism from our audience, risking the 
perceived success of our performance (Goffman 1959:51). We also invoke audience separation 
to leave our audience in awe, or in some cases shame, of our performance (Goffman 1959:70). 
When NRM leaders falter, especially in the limited relevance of their teachings, they risk the 
validity of their entire organization to members of the group; these members are then given an 
opportunity to poke holes in the overall logic and agenda. Which is why it is even more 
important that the charismatic leader separate from his audience to leave them in awe of his 
ideology, practice, and presence. Furthermore, this separation isn’t necessarily always a literal 
separation, but rather making sure the audience is homogenous—or doesn’t include different 
people who all have different perceptions of the leader in one group (Goffman 1959:49). 
These performances are vital to understand because “everyone plays a role…which we 
use to understand one another and ourselves,” as we play a role both for others and for ourselves 
(Goffman 1959:19). In an NRM, the leader can be privy to his performance as a messiah because 
all of the roles of the group are engaged in active performance-management. Regardless of the 
group or organization, individuals are necessary to make up the whole—each playing a pivotal 
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part in the success or failure of the group’s performance altogether. The essence of a 
performance is that we use them to “show an idealized view of situations and better versions of 
ourselves” (Goffman 1959:35). It is often reported by former members that, at least in part, their 
motivations for joining said group were directly linked to the way others perceived them upon 
joining; they cited an opportunity to ‘better themselves’ thanks to the moral pursuits of the NRM.  
Another important inclusion within performance is referencing ‘identity talk’ and 
‘institution talk’ as discussed earlier in Chapter 2, because “ the talk and interaction remain 
operating vehicles through which individuals construct selves” especially as these elements 
But, where Gubrium and Holstein slightly 109). 2000: relate to morals (Gubrium and Holstein
Neither are ‘selves’ unfettered performances or from Goffman is in their critique that “ differ
109). Instead, they suggest 2000:situationally convenient presentations” (Gubrium and Holstein 
the moral agendas and ecting practice, refl-in-discoursesof artifacts that these selves are also “
concerns and discursive environments the diverse going of material constraints of postmodern 
109).Gubrium and Holstein 2000:life” (  These ‘going concerns’ reflect the intricacy of our social 
environment, not only complicating performance, but engaging individuals in a complex role 
management between their performances and these greater institutions.  
These greater institutions include what Goffman calls ‘Total Institutions’ in his work, 
Asylum, and what Scott refers to in modern life as ‘Reinventive Institutions’. Based on 
Goffman’s model, but reintroduced in Scott’s work, Total Institutions are “a place of residence 
and work where a large number of situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an 
appreciable length of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (Scott 
2010:214). What comes to mind first upon imagining this total institution, is a cult; most likely, 
the cult community lives wholly and completely in a commune-like setting, closed off from the 
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rest of society. The key elements of such included, “(a) the unfolding of the daily round in the 
same place and under the same authority; (b) batch living or being treated as part of an 
anonymous mass; (c) the rigid timetabling and scheduling of activities; and (d) an institutional 
goal of resocialization,” which contributes to the cult-like image (Scott 2010:215). Most 
importantly, however, these total institutions “revealed how organizational structures shape the 
behavior of individuals through the authoritative imposition of consequential identities” (Scott 
2010:215). In a cult, or NRM, the identities that are imposed upon members are hierarchical, 
resulting in a top-down division of power. The hierarchy model ensures that, while it may appear 
that everyone is living and working in harmony, everyone has a place and must know their place 
well enough to avoid dysfunction within the community. This resolves that individuals and 
institutions form “agentic team performance,” a direct connection to Goffman which will be 
discussed later on in this chapter, that is involved in identity performance and development 
(Scott 2010:215). The team network suggests that it is not just one individual whose successful 
adaptation of his/her role is necessary, but that in order for the organization to maintain stability, 
it becomes a multi-person performance.  
Scott introduces reinventive institutions (RIs), or “places to which people retreat for 
periods of intense self-reflection, education, enrichment and reform, but under their own volition, 
in pursuit of ‘self-improvement’” that are focused on reinventing a new, more improved, self 
(Scott 2010:218). They have often been called “greedy institutions” for the claim they have on 
“the totality of their members’ social identities by pervading every role they play and every 
aspect of their lifestyle,” much like cults do in private spaces known in popular culture as the 
commune (Scott 2010:218). However, RIs are unique from total institutions because, in 
contemporary society, they are often sought out by the individual in hopes of attaining a new 
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version of him, her, or themselves. RIs apply more broadly to this thesis because they can 
address Greek Life, as well. Greek Life does not function with the same commune-style set up as 
NRMs, but instead encourages a mold to be filled with the false pretense of absolute 
individuality. It is of practice within religious cults to form “a symbolic boundary between 
insiders and outsiders that is equally powerful: these are disciplinary mechanisms, not blockades 
or ‘institutions without walls’, which members are ostensibly free to leave but choose not to” 
(Scott 2010:219). Again, there is a pretense of freedom and individuality within the RI. They 
become similarly problematic, however, because there are underlying mechanisms within the 
organizations which can serve as incentives or punishments that prevent an individual from 
freely leaving the environment or organization. 
What is most identifiable about reinventive institutions, according to the author, is their 
relationship to the “culture of dissatisfaction with the fallible self” (Scott 2010:219). RIs serve as 
a bridge between total institutions and performance because they introduce the concept of 
purposeful self-construction, as opposed to the use of force or undeniable deceit and coercion. 
Instead of nixing the old self, they become a viable, even intuitive option, because “[t]hey offer 
to process, reshape and reform by trimming away negative emotional experiences, so that what 
emerges is a set of ‘gingerbread people’” (Scott 2010:219). The emotional component, although 
important to personal motivations, membership management, and dramaturgical performance, 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The author plays with the idea of “life politics (Giddens, 
1991) writ large: an anxious preoccupation with the self as a reflexive project, and a quest for 
authentic living that necessitates our trust in abstract systems of expertise” which can only be 
achieved when an individual seeks out RIs (Scott 2010:220). The idea that individuals join Greek 
Life or NRMs because they are seeking more authentic versions of themselves, suggests that 
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they are purposefully attempting to make an active change in their performance of self. The 
contemporary notion that one’s self is not good enough to be left alone, but moreover, must be 
actively changed by joining such a powerful group, suggests that the making of a self is a very 
social experience, not innate or natural.  
Foucault’s approach, according to Scott’s analysis, suggests that “power is most effective 
when it operates not through coercive domination but by securing the willing compliance of 
subjects to be governed” (Scott 2010:221). These subjects willingly submit themselves to the 
rules and regulations of the powerful group upon initiation to said group, because they believe it 
to be most beneficial to their pursuit of an authentic self, suggesting that they don’t believe their 
own performances support the best version of themselves; better yet, they need these institutions 
to help guide them to an acceptable societal version of selfhood. Scott continues by stating that 
“Performative regulation occurs where groups of people submit themselves to the authority of an 
institution, internalize its values and enact them through mutual surveillance in an inmate 
culture”—which is a combination of thought from both Goffman and Foucault, since power is 
both “horizontal and vertical” in our “Panopticonic culture of surveillance” (Scott 2010:221). If 
individuals are joining these groups and adopting its values willingly, they are more likely to 
reinforce the rules, regulations, and values upon one another simply by adopting them 
themselves—allowing the appearance of a free-willed institution. It is the ability of these 
institutions to prioritize group involvement and engagement, either by group therapy, collective 
prayer, and group meetings, or the like, that forms “a valuation of group process, interaction and 
ritual echoes the performative regulation” (Scott 2010:223). The validation of these exercises 
further contributes to the individuals’ belief that doing so will lead to a better version of 
themselves. The uniqueness of RIs is their nuanced restrictiveness, or the lack of “performative 
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autonomy [from members] compromised by the discipline of interaction order” (Scott 2010:227). 
RIs, including both NRMs and Greek Life organizations, are manipulative because they reduce 
individuals to a lack of autonomy in their performance as opposed to autonomy in everyday 
activities alone, like total institutions would.  
Goffman, in his work on performances, suggests that performances affect reality because 
we use them to legitimize, and eventually institutionalize, aspects of our society, such as social 
strata and status. This provides a gateway with which gender roles and socioeconomic 
differences can become normalized: The manipulation of roles within hierarchical organizations 
such as NRMs can attest to the validity of a strong male role model, who in a religious sect is 
often the self-proclaimed Prophet speaking the word of God, which can lead to the opportunity 
for polygamy, child abuse, physical, emotional, and psychologically controlling behaviors 
(Crockford 2018:95). The implications of such a position are indicative of broader traditional 
gender roles and the distribution of power based on gender, class, race/ethnicity, and other 
characteristics. 
 Goffman argues that neither extreme truth nor complete falsehood in performance is 
desirable—which relays well into Scott’s message, that RIs are a powerful institutional force that 
can afflict and complicate the conception of ‘selves’ further. Both suggest this is because we, as 
an audience, often seek to determine the sincerity of a performance—attempting to identify them 
as either “contrived or real” (Scott 2010:75). Our navigation of these social performances is what 
can encourage us to decide to join or leave a group in the first place. This is conducive to 
understanding how and why individuals will negotiate his/her/their identities to fit inside such a 
punitive box, like a cult for instance. The idea of working as a collective to uphold a 
 36 
performance, especially in the form of maintaining a common message and purpose as an 
organization, epitomizes what Goffman suggests is a social performance.  
 The second part of Goffman’s book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), is 
meant to break from the boundaries of merely individual level social interaction to something 
much more intricate—teamwork in performance, or as Scott referred to it, “agentic team 
performance” (Scott 2010:215). According to Goffman, a teammate is “someone whose 
dramaturgical cooperation one is dependent upon in fostering a given definition of a situation” 
(1959:80). Team management and establishment of a performance involves and engages multiple 
players with whom are responsible for maintaining different roles and employing different 
techniques depending on the outcomes of the said situation. The importance of the team is in 
establishing an “impression of confidence” meant to convince the audience of the validity and 
authenticity of the performance (Goffman 1959:90). In some cases, the roles will be allocated by 
the director of the performance, who “goes between them and the audience” (Goffman 1959:99). 
This suggests that we incorporate power in subtle ways: the group leader is the one setting the 
stage and defining the scope of all group interactions—but the director is and does not have to be 
the only ‘director’. Symbolic interaction within this group suggests that more power belongs to 
who is directing what’s going on and the dictation of other people needing to please and 
acquiesce to one another, the audience, or the leader; for example, this relates to NRM members 
or Greek life members choosing to leave or being kicked out of their organizations because they 
were removed from their leadership roles, leaving a feeling of emptiness and disconnectedness. 
The best example of a director in NRMs is charismatic leaders—these individuals are 
responsible for managing both the performance and the audience’s reception of said 
performance. A perceived Prophet cannot make his performance palpable without the 
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participation of other key members and the encouragement from the audience, which is initiated 
by the closeness of the Prophet in his personal relationships with the audience. In order to do so, 
the team must be aware of the fields with which a performance is occupied by, the front region, 
which occupies “accentuated facts and appearance” (Goffman 1959:111). They must also note 
the backstage, in which performers can “drop the front” they are attempting to put on (Goffman 
1959:112); finally, the team must be aware of the outside, which is “neither front nor 
back…[where] a different show is being put on” (Goffman 1959:135). These areas require the 
involvement of a team, whether it is necessarily the original team who is actively performing the 
performance, or an alternative team that is either opposed or subsequently engaged, to invoke 
techniques for “impression management” (Goffman 1959:113).  
 Some of the challenges facing a team when attempting to define a situation a particular 
way includes the multitude of characters who have the capacity to harm or benefit the team, the 
nuances of collusion within a team, and the “information control” that is necessary to execute a 
performance (Goffman 1959:141). This includes the extent to which members might be keeping 
group secrets from administration i.e. behaviors that are not allowed; For NRMs and Greek Life, 
the administration is the law or community, the group must keep knowledge inside and/or protect 
secrets, including hazing and the use of techniques to keep things hidden from supervision (for 
Greek Life, supervisors are advisors)—a big part of this could be setting i.e. off campus housing 
or secret get-aways from the compound. Other roles include the “traitor” or “spy” and the 
“renegade,” who starts to attempt to undermine the existing leadership, these are the most risky 
to the performance; the “shill” (a pre-planted enthusiastic joiner working from the inside) 
“spotters”, “mediator”, “non-person service specialist” (a person who knows what’s happening 
but isn’t a part of the group) the “trainer,” the “side-kick,” and the “colleague” are lower risk, 
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meaning that some roles help protect the team and some both the audience and the team 
(Goffman 1959:145). The collusion involved within a performance by members of a team, 
outsiders, oneself, or even with the audience is very complex—it is a unique element of 
performance because it has the potential for “backstage fraternization” which is initiated by 
individuals being allowed backstage of the performance (Goffman 1959:192). In order to prevent 
the embarrassment which comes from pulling the curtain on the performance, a team needs 
“dramaturgical loyalty, discipline, and circumspection” (Goffman 1959:214). Loyalty involves 
being careful with whom one shares backstage access; discipline involves maintaining one’s self-
control and character maintenance despite the challenges of a performance; circumspection is the 
ability to prepare for a show and to know what, when, where, and how of a performance ahead of 
time (Goffman 1959:218).  
The most important takeaway from part two of Goffman’s book is that not only can 
performances be analyzed “technically, politically, structurally, and culturally,” but they must 
also be analyzed inter-sectionally with a dramaturgical element (Goffman 1959:240). 
Dramaturgy for Goffman allows individuals to technically see “the standard of work,” to 
politically see “the capacities of one individual to direct the activity of another,” to structurally 
see “the image that different status groupings can maintain,” and culturally see “the maintenance 
of moral standards” (Goffman 1959:243). Goffman’s contribution suggests there is more to 
performance than meets the eye—that it is not just the individual level interaction that matters, 
but that context matters to the authenticity and effectiveness of performances too.  
Additionally, different types of ‘selves’ have been introduced in contemporary work that 
help articulate Goffman’s meaning by providing examples of performance in action: The 
‘idealized self’, introduced by Snow and Anderson articulates the disconnect between a homeless 
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person’s identity and the way others see him/her/them (Snow and Anderson 1987:1351). 
Goffman suggests that the essence of a performance is that we use them to “show an idealized 
view of situations and better versions of ourselves” (Goffman 1959:35). It is often reported by 
former members that, at least in part, their motivations for joining said group were directly 
linked to the way others perceived them upon joining; they cited an opportunity to ‘better 
themselves’. In seeking an opportunity to better oneself, both NRMs (New Religious 
Movements) and Greek Life can become options for an individual. ‘Bettering oneself’ is often 
cited as reasoning for college students going through sorority or fraternity recruitment; they are 
hoping to improve their social statuses or become better ‘more collegial’ versions of their former 
high-school selves. As far as New Religious Movements are concerned, the traditional commune 
type structure of earlier movements, like the Branch Davidians out of Waco, Texas for instance, 
provided a setting and system for achieving some form of religious or spiritual enlightenment, 
advertised as being morally superior to the previous version of any self. However, despite the 
best efforts of these individuals, and the best of intentions upon joining, this ‘idealized self’ can 
be compared to a mirage in the desert; the ‘idealized version’ of the self almost never matches up 
to the perception of others for the same version of that ‘self,’ rearing the ‘idealized self’ useless 
and imaginary.  
Gubrium and Holstein identify a “culture of dissatisfaction with the fallible self” 
(2000:219). The ‘fallible self’ being a troubled, imperfect self (by society’s measure) that needs 
to be worked on in order to become an accepted social self; something that needs to be worked 
on is essentially a performance. The ‘fallible self’ is related to the ‘idealized self’ because both 
involve some need for change and/or self- improvement, leading to a new self. The key 
difference is that the ‘fallible self’ is imperfect first, whereas, the ‘idealized self’ is the final, 
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infallible version. Instead of nixing the old self, re-inventive institutions become a viable, even 
intuitive option, because “They offer to process, reshape and reform by trimming away negative 
emotional experiences, so that what emerges is a set of ‘gingerbread people’” (Gubrium and 
Holstein 2000:219). These ‘gingerbread people’ occupy accepted versions of the ‘self’ and have 
been artificially created to fix the problems that were originally detected within the ‘fallible self’. 
Greek Life offers the best comparison of the ‘gingerbread people’ that arise from the ‘fallible 
self’, because it is common on many campuses that certain fraternities and sororities have 
reputations for being superior or inferior to others on campus. Among these reputations are 
perceptions of individual members as fitting the right mold, making it easy for him/her/them to 
join a particular community. Logically speaking, once an entire group reduces its individuality in 
preference of the ‘mold’, this group has become a ‘gingerbread house’ so to speak.  
Although a performance-based approach to understanding the self is deserving of its own 
chapter, it cannot stand alone as the sole theory about the sociological self because the 
performance theory’s greatest limitation is that it does not account for as much about one’s 
emotions or contemporary elements of the sociological examination of the self—which is why it 
is supplemented by other theorists within its own chapter as well as with other concrete ideas in 
other chapters. While Goffman gives credence to external factors in the second part of his book, 
it is a minor point within his book that must be developed more to help explain ongoing 
phenomena, especially within powerful groups. Goffman’s dramaturgical analysis does allow us 
to understand how there is the potential for “alienation from the self”—for instance, if one is 
concerned that they are making a ‘poor’ impression and not putting forward the right front in a 
performance (Goffman 1959:236). Goffman’s perspective of the self is that it is “a product of the 
scene that is created, not a cause” (1959:252). The individual self is, more precisely, a product of 
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“all of the arrangements” of a performance, including the performer(s), the props, the audience, 
and any outsiders who are also involved (Goffman 1959:253). Dramaturgy, along with other 
‘arrangements’, which also include reinventive institutions and ‘going concerns’, can provide a 
full visual of how individuals interact within their social spheres while still considering structural 
and/or symbolic boundaries to these spheres. This chapter reinforces Goffman’s theory of 
performance while also citing the need for theories like Gubrium and Holstein’s ‘Going 
concerns’ as well as Scott’s ‘Reinventive Institutions’ theories to convey a membership 























     CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 This chapter is meant to describe the influence of emotions in identity management. I will 
articulate why emotions are necessary to identity work and to understanding identity, describe 
how emotions can and do play a role in recruitment and evolution of membership in powerful 
groups, and describe emotion management sociologically. This chapter will primarily be based 
on scholarship by Lynn Smith-Lovin, as well as connections back to Stryker and Burke, to 
describe the influence of emotions on communicating the importance of certain roles to the self. 
Emotions act as a way to hone-in on the most important elements of any given interaction, and 
even guide future interactions. Emotions act as a medium with which individuals can incorporate 
greater cultural phenomenon into their daily lives and rituals. Most importantly, emotions are a 
tool with which we can confirm our sense of self—they give credence to the question of ‘how’ 
we construct the identities listed above, as well as to how we exercise these identities once we 
subject them to socialization.  
 Sociologically speaking, emotional labor is defined as “one to induce or suppress feeling 
in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of mind in others” 
(Hochschild 2012:20). In terms of everyday life, we use these emotion norms, set out to enforce 
emotional labor, to manage our social roles and expectations. Emotion norms or “feeling rules” 
dictate how we are supposed to feel, how long we are supposed to feel any given emotion, the 
time and place for emotions, and reactions to emotions (Hochschild 2012:52). Everything from 
gender roles to interacting in the workforce can be related to emotion management, including 
negotiating identities and ‘sense of self’.  
To introduce more recent theories related to emotion management and the self, Smith-
Lovin as well as Stryker and Burke offer an approach that is based in earlier theories discussed in 
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Chapter 2, primarily that of social roles. Smith-Lovin refer to other sociologists when they 
suggest that there is a link between emotion management and expression and the self by means 
of role-taking theory, first introduced by McCall and Simmons. This is because these theories 
cite that an “emotional reaction depend(s) on the actors' definitions of the situation and the 
meanings that grow out of these definitions” (Smith-Lovin 1995:128). Role taking can be both 
reflexive and empathic, reflexive being focused on one’s ability “to see him or herself from the 
perspective of an object,” while empathic is adopting another position (Smith-Lovin 1995:128). 
Therefore, classical theory is still very much involved in an individual’s conception of the self in 
regard to his/her/their emotions because, as Mead suggests, individuals reference themselves as 
objects in the social setting. Because we see ourselves as objects, we are able to conceptualize 
implications of our emotional reactions, suggesting that, as Smith-Lovin says, emotional 
reactions cannot be thought of as innate, but as social elements to our behavior. 
Furthermore, Stryker and Burke suggest a more detailed model of how emotions affect 
the role hierarchy model. Stryker and Burke are referenced regarding emotion management and 
the self because “For Stryker, emotions…served as motivators: role relationships that generated 
positive affect would be enacted more frequently and would move upward in the salience 
hierarchy that constituted one's self-definition… [while those] that routinely caused 
dissatisfaction and pain would move downward in the hierarchy” (Smith-Lovin 1995:128). 
Additionally, emotions would arise from an inability to perform a role sufficiently—particularly 
negative ones (Smith-Lovin 1995:128). Finally, emotions “signal a sense of importance of 
relationships for the self” (Smith-Lovin 1995:128). More so, a lack of role support would evoke 
negative emotions as well (Smith-Lovin 1995:128). Because emotions dictate such drastic 
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changes in the hierarchy, they ultimately influence identity negotiation, especially within a 
powerful group where understanding one’s role is crucial to the success of the group. 
 Furthermore, understanding role confirmation is crucial to connecting identity to 
emotions. Smith-Lovin comments on a theory about self-concept and self-verification to suggest 
that “people construct events to confirm fundamental meanings about self and others” (Smith-
Lovin 1995:129). We utilize these events to better understand how we fit into our social roles 
within a certain group, or even greater society as a whole. Events signal emotions, which in turn 
can be correlated to social capital. If we recognize ourselves to be relatively high in social 
capital, we may venture to use this capital to join Greek Life on our college campus, in hopes of 
achieving more. Otherwise, if we find ourselves to be low in social capital, or ‘outcasts’ of some 
sort, we may be more likely to join a group outside of what’s common, e.g., a cult. We use our 
emotions because they are a “powerful motivating force, signaling the need for social action to 
restore fundamental affective meanings” which encourage our sense of self, thereby further 
recognizing our own role hierarchy (Smith-Lovin 1995:129). In another instance, status and 
power are correlated to certain feelings, articulating that “Relative positions on these dimensions 
defined the key aspects of a relationship and determined its emotional character. Changes in 
status and power led to specific emotional outcomes. For example, loss of power resulted in fear 
or anxiety; guilt resulted from excess power” (Smith-Lovin 1995:130). This is especially 
indicative of individuals who choose to leave a powerful group once their leadership is proved 
ineffective or stripped from their identity, resulting in negative emotions correlated to that 
particular identity; the individual is, thereby, more likely to seek a new identity hierarchy, even 
insofar as leaving that particular group. 
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 In Smith-Lovin’s theory, she suggests that status and power acknowledged cultural 
backgrounds as well, suggesting that “religious rituals could be developed to produce identity-
affirming emotional responses” (Smith-Lovin 1995:132). In NRMs, for example, this concept 
can be applied to analyzing how members feel before and after particular sermons or church 
services that appeal to his/her/their identities. If it is a service that recognizes minority identities, 
such as LBGTQ+, as being ‘seen by God,’ the individual will likely feel more connected to both 
their sexual identity as well as their religious identity (Smith-Lovin 1995).  
Moreover, emotions play a large role in mental health, which can adversely impact 
identity development and maintenance. Smith-Lovin cites Thoit’s suggestion that, “in general, 
those who have few network contacts and few social roles are more distressed than those who are 
better integrated into society” (Smith-Lovin 1995:137). In a powerful group with at best, 
minimal outside socialization permitted or encouraged, members typically fall into this category 
of having few network contacts and less societal integration (since their only network is with one 
another), subjecting members to potentially poor mental health. The typical measures of mental 
health include “control over life events, inequity or victimization, and availability and usefulness 
internal of coping mechanisms” (Smith Lovin 1995:137). In NRMs especially, where a private 
commune is common, individuals are expected to be ‘all about the collective’ and have minimal, 
if any, ‘selfish’ concerns. Members are not independent, but dependent on the collective, giving 
up control, equity, and availability of mental health resources (and other resources) in favor of 
security or a sense of belonging. Within a powerful group, a political and social hierarchy 
reiterates the need for individuals to confirm his or her sense of self particularly in instances of 
disagreement. As Smith-Lovin (1995) suggests, “If someone disagreed with a low-status person, 
that person would attribute responsibility for the disagreement to his own low-quality task 
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contribution and would respond emotionally with depression” (140). The hierarchy reinforces 
structure and role maintenance by likewise reinforcing certain emotional responses to these roles, 
allowing the hierarchy to continue. Additionally, emotion management and group hierarchy are 
facilitated in everyday conversations, especially via interruptions; these interruptions “were 
conversational mechanisms used to limit the participation of low-evaluation, low power 
members to appropriate” membership (Smith-Lovin 1995:140). Without the participation of 
general members, either in Greek Life or NRMs, the hierarchy is able to prevail, keeping the 
group in check. In Greek Life, it is commonplace that during chapter meetings—the only 
consecutive and reliable full group meeting every week—the ritual script only permits members 
in leadership positions to bring up particular concerns, allowing them to generate the group 
metanarrative. In cults, or NRMs, gender and age also play a role, ensuring that most often, there 
is a need to silence women and children, since typically leadership roles are reserved for men.  
In conclusion, emotions are necessary to understanding powerful group involvement 
because they help us navigate our social role hierarchy. Our emotions help us navigate the world 
around us, especially membership within powerful groups. We need to stay in touch and 
prioritize emotions, because “[e]motions put us in providing  ’me,‘touch with the personal us 
















This thesis has approached the subject of the sociological examination of the self in the 
context of powerful groups, which as we have discussed are New Religious Movements (more 
popularly known as cults) and Greek Life. To address such a broad topic, we first had to 
understand the sociological perspective of the self from classical theorists found in Chapter 1, 
Cooley, Mead, and Blumer, who each contributed the makings of what is today a modern 
understanding of the self in the social, and not merely psychological, context. These theorists 
highlighted that the self cannot exist without others; Cooley includes different levels of 
consciousness to suggest that there are different social perspectives to the self; Mead contributed 
further with the notion that there is a perceived other when one thinks about him/herself: 
Individuals can see him/her/themselves as an object as well as a subject; finally, Blumer argues 
that we are not merely passive beings, but active social beings.  
 In Chapter 2, many different contemporary theories of the ‘self’ provide the reader with 
an understanding of different types of ‘selves’ that help conceptualize powerful groups. 
Examples of these theories include the role hierarchy model, self-concept, identity-talk, inner 
and outer self-esteem, identity-salience, and going concerns models of self-construction and 
identity navigation. These contemporary theories of the self help prepare the reader to recognize 
the differences in sociological theory, altogether from classical theory to contemporary theory to 
performance and emotional theories related to the ‘self’.  
 In Chapter 3, this thesis included elements of performance and dramaturgy, as well as 
how theorists connected this individual level of interaction to what Scott calls ‘reinventive 
institutions’, a structural argument in nature. In Chapter 4, this thesis primarily focuses on Smith-
Lovin’s work on emotions in identity management; emotions are critical in our understanding of 
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the self in the context of powerful groups because they are innately social and influence the way 
we think about one another and ourselves.  
 All of the above chapters provide a unique perspective to sociological theory on the self, 
with symbolic interactionism at the forefront. Thinking about NRMs and Greek Life is not only 
necessary and important to better grasping what we think of as having a ‘self’ but is important 
because these groups yield a great amount of power over individuals, whether this is regarding 
resources, geography, personal networks, social roles available, emotions, and the way we 
construct our identities to reflect such a membership. Sociology is the perfect lens with which to 
study these powerful groups because not only do these groups prey on individuals and their 
social capital, but these groups are based in, and have a meaningful impact, on the rest of society 
as well. Sociologists and non-sociologists alike can relate to this thesis and should prioritize the 
study of the ‘self’, because regardless of the subject area, we all interact in society and negotiate 
our identities every day.  If our goal is to pursue meaningful lives and productive careers, as the 
Rollins Mission statement suggests, we must first understand ourselves and the groups we have 
the opportunity of joining.  
 In terms of the future of the ‘self’, this thesis suggests that credibility and credence 
should be reserved for modern sociological theory on the ‘self’ as opposed to post-modern theory 
on the ‘self’’, much like what has been offered in both chapters 2 and 3. Questions that continue 
to linger are the following: Does role hierarchy truly dictate the most legitimate identity…how 
much of this is socially contrived? How powerful are emotions really in identity negotiation? Is 
there a way to limit the ‘going concerns’ of the complex global world to preserve our identities? 
Is there an objectifiable ‘core self’ or ‘true self’? How can we find it? 
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 The biggest limitation of this thesis is that it is not empirical research on these groups, 
merely speculation based on sociological theory that has been informed by others’ limited 
empirical research. While this work can be thought of as a complex thought experiment, its 
greatest benefit and contribution is its ability to inform new research on the self, focused on 
attempting to answer the above questions. New research could take the form of participant 
observation within either group, or a longitudinal study focused on individual’s conceptions and 
descriptions of themselves within or without of said group. There is limited research on identity 
negotiation once individuals exit a cult, but I would also be interested to see how these powerful 
groups compare to one another in this area of study. Based on our understanding of how complex 
and complicated, but also socially influenced, our negotiations of our ‘selves’ are, I would posit 
that the identity negotiations within both groups share many thematic elements of the above 
theories, but even more importantly, they are influenced by structure just as much as their 
perceptions of their own daily interactions. Moreover, I would argue that these theories should be 
used in tandem with one another; I suggest that emotions are most likely to legitimate an 
individual’s identity, by reinforcing a role hierarchy and that the majority of this conception of 
self is interpreted versions of social interactions and reactions; I argue that ‘going concerns’ can 
never be truly ignored, only limited for a short period of time, since our worlds are so inter-
connected and can no longer exist fully independently. Lastly, and what I believe to be the most 
difficult answer, is that we may never know for certain whether there exists a ‘true self’, 
primarily because we all fall victim to negotiating our identity from the perspective of others in 
our society. However, I will not lose sight of the possibility of a ‘true self’ because my 
intellectual curiosity won’t let me do so: There is a reason why we love to watch movies, listen 
to songs, and read books where the heroine is breaking from the mold of society; we like to 
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fantasize about becoming our ‘true selves’. So to keep the mystery alive, I theorize that the best 
way to stay in pursuit of the ‘true self’ is by continuing to further our empirical research on the 
self in powerful groups, for this is the best way to drastically compare and contrast a ‘self’ from 
the different dimensions of the ‘self’—without the powerful group setting, there wouldn’t be as 
strong of a backdrop for beliefs, values, and expectations of the individual. It is here where you 
can see the influence of the group and what originality may be left for the ‘self’. 
Finally, the implications of the societal treatment of NRMs and Greek Life must be 
discussed. New Religious Movements are often viewed with emotions in mind; they are often 
described as tragic, fictional stories, so far away from our immediate lives that they become a 
spectacle to be gossiped about. Greek life, on the other hand, is seen as a token of privilege; 
members of sororities and fraternities, while often satirized as being unintelligent or aloof in 
media and film, are overall envied roles. These stereotypes affect outside perceptions of 
individuals based on their membership to either powerful group, resulting in an inevitably 
changed sense of self—due to many of the components of self that have been discussed in prior 
chapters, much like inner and outer self-esteem, role hierarchy, and even individual or group 
performances. A changed sense of self, whether for better or worse, can have a significant impact 
on someone’s daily life as well as his/her/their future: It can dictate someone’s emotions, affect 
their self-worth, determine how they interact within their group, whether they take a leadership 
role, or whether they choose to leave the group and their life afterward. At its core, it is 
important for us to understand that outside judgments, formed by the societal collective, feed the 
reputation, or perceived reputation, of said group, leading to the stereotypes that are affiliated 
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